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Bertelsmann Stiftung High-Level Board of Experts on the Future of 
Global Trade Governance 
In the light of rising threats to the multilateral trading system, the Bertelsmann Stiftung has called into life a High-
Level Board of Experts on the Future of Global Trade Governance. Composed of seasoned trade diplomats and 
distinguished experts, it is identifying feasible options to reinvigorate the World Trade Organization (WTO). To 
inform the discussions of the Board, Bertelsmann Stiftung has commissioned additional research. This paper by 
Dr Robert Basedow is intended to provide an overview of the challenges the WTO currently faces and which op-
tions have already be put on the table to address them. It reflects the views of the author which are not 
necessarily those of the Board. 
Further information on the High-Level Board of Experts and its work can be found on futuretradegovernance.org 
and ged-project.de. 
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1. Executive summary  
 
The multilateral trade regime and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are a major success story 
of global governance. In few other domains have states managed to cooperate as successfully in 
the last 70 years as in global trade affairs. Since the 1990s, the multilateral trade regime – with 
the WTO at its centre – nonetheless goes through a crisis. The crisis culminated in 2016 with the 
collapse of the Doha Round. The crisis puts into question the WTO’s ability to effectively and 
efficiently govern global trade. Stakeholders, moreover, increasingly challenge the legitimacy and 
accountability of the WTO.  
 
The main purpose of the study is to review E15 work to identify weaknesses in the WTO’s 
institutional setup and related reform proposals. As institutional aspects received comparatively 
little attention, the study draws also on other academic and policy publications to complement 
E15 work. The underlying rationale is that the current crisis has various – including institutional 
– causes. An institutional reform may thus contribute to overcoming the WTO’s current problems. 
The political climate does not allow for wholesale amendments to the WTO Agreement. The study 
therefore focuses on incremental reform proposals rather than grand and ideal-type solutions. 
The study focuses on three main challenges and reform areas. The following paragraphs provide 
a first overview (for more detail see summary table in annexe):  
 
I. Enhancing the WTO’s legitimacy and accountability: The WTO arguably suffers from a 
democratic deficit. In the eyes of its critics, the WTO lacks legitimacy, accountability and 
transparency. These perceptions undermine the WTO’s standing as a policy-making forum. 
The following proposals may help to address the democratic deficit:  
1. Creation of standing advisory councils for business, trade unions and NGOs; 
2. Public consultations for negotiations and Committee measures;  
3. Greater involvement of national parliaments in WTO affairs; 
4. Review the WTO’s strategy on external transparency (including its web presence and 
documentation).  
 
II. Ensuring the WTO’s effectiveness and efficiency: The failure of the Doha Round has kindled 
doubts over the WTO’s effectiveness and efficiency. Critiques question the organisation’s 
ability to serve as negotiating platform, to manage the multilateral trade regime and to resolve 
trade disputes. Such criticism may be unjust and misdirected in part. Yet, it is clear that the 
WTO has to adjust to an altered policy-making context. Multilateral trade negotiations are 
unlikely to happen in the foreseeable future. The WTO’s legislative function as a producer of 
trade law and market access commitments largely falls away. Instead the WTO’s executive and 
judicative function will be at the heart of WTO work. The WTO Secretariat, the Committee 
system and the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will have to fill the void left by the collapse of 
the Doha Round and adjust the multilateral trade regime to the evolving realities of global 
trade in order to maintain its effectiveness and efficiency. The following proposals aim at 
strengthening the organisation in this regard:  
1. Creation of a WTO Executive Committee for better leadership;   
2. Stronger agenda setting powers for the WTO Secretariat;  
3. Enhance the WTO Secretariat’s research and data collection capacity;  
4. Adjust the WTO Secretariat and Committee structure;  
5. Get domestic regulators involved in Committee work; 
6. Promote the use of Good Regulatory Practices in the WTO and in WTO members;  
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7. Establish the WTO as platform for dealing with GVCs for instance through Supply 
Chain Councils;  
8. Integrate transnational private regulatory activity in WTO work;  
9. Develop a strategy to anchor the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in a complex trade 
regime of Preferential Trade Agreements and Plurilateral Agreements.  
 
III. Transform the WTO into a negotiating and knowledge platform for regional and 
plurilateral agreements:  A cause and a symptom of the collapse of the Doha Round is the 
unseen surge in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and plurilateral agreements (PAs) 
during the last decade. States increasingly turn away from cumbersome multilateral 
negotiations toward regional and plurilateral venues. For the WTO to remain relevant and to 
safeguard the multilateral trade regime, the WTO must reconceive itself as a knowledge and 
negotiating platform for PTAs and PAs. It may thereby ensure that these agreements 
constitute ‘building’ rather than ‘stumbling’ blocks for the multilateral trade regime. The 
following proposals may help the WTO to assume its new role:  
1. Create a ‘PTA’ exchange as a clearinghouse and expert platform;    
2. Introduce multilateral impact assessments to ensure the multilateral-friendliness of 
PAs and major PTAs;  
3. Establish a Committee to coordinate, to avoid norm overlap and incoherence across 
PAs and to develop guidelines on multilateral-friendly PAs;  
4. Provide technical assistance for developing and least developing countries to join PAs. 
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2. Introduction  
 
The multilateral trade regime – with the World Trade Organization (WTO) at its centre – is a 
remarkable success story of global governance. The GATT/WTO has made an outstanding 
contribution to poverty reduction, human development, welfare growth and peaceful global 
cooperation since its creation in 1948. While average tariffs ranged between 20-30% in the 1950s, 
they have fallen to less than 4% in OECD countries nowadays (Hoekman, 2011). Trade quotas 
have been sharply reduced or dismantled. The strengthening of the dispute settlement 
mechanism and new trade disciplines for services, intellectual property rights, investments and 
alike have made trade relations more predictable for customers, producers and states. Finally, the 
GATT/WTO regime has evolved from a small club of 23 fairly homogenous developed Western 
economies in the post-war era into a truly global regime with 164 members. Few other 
multilateral regimes have a comparable track record.  
 
The WTO and the multilateral trade regime, nonetheless, are in crisis today. Since the foundation 
of the GATT/WTO, multilateral negotiations have been the core business of the regime. In 2016, 
the Doha Round, however, collapsed after 15 years without tangible results. The inability of WTO 
members to forge a consensus on a new grand multilateral deal challenges the raison d’être of the 
WTO. It undermines the WTO’s ability to adjust to the evolving realities of global trade. Developing 
and least developed countries (LDCs), moreover, criticise the WTO and the multilateral trade 
regime for having failed them. Past promises of a more development-friendly global trade context 
have arguably not been kept. And also in developed countries, citizens, policy-makers and non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) increasingly challenge the benefits of international trade and 
lament opaque and undemocratic decision-making within the WTO. In short, the WTO and the 
multilateral trade regime face an existential legitimacy, accountability and functionality crisis.  
 
The causes underlying the crisis of the multilateral trade regime and the WTO are diverse. The 
crisis is rooted inter alia in structural changes in the global political economy, the evolving 
substance of international trade policy and negotiations and finally in weaknesses in the 
institutional setup of the WTO (Hoekman, 2011; Narlikar et al., 2012; Sutherland et al., 2004; 
Warwick Commission, 2007). Some causes of the crisis are thus of structural nature. They defy 
short-term political interventions and solutions. Other causes are of political nature. Policy-
makers may address these causes through appropriate initiatives and help to reinvigorate the 
WTO and the multilateral trade regime.   
 
This study reviews E15 work to identify institutional weaknesses of the WTO and related reform 
proposals. It fills gaps and complements E15 work where useful with other academic and policy 
publications. An institutional reform of the WTO may constitute a necessary – yet not sufficient – 
step to lift the multilateral trade regime out of crisis. The study focuses on incremental reform 
proposals, as the political climate at the global level and at the domestic level in major trading 
nations does not allow for major amendments to the WTO Agreement.  
 
The study is structured as following. The first section provides a brief introduction for non-expert 
readers. It discusses the legislative, executive and judicative functions of the WTO; how the 
current crisis affects these functions; the main causes underlying the current crisis; and how an 
institutional reform may redress the WTO’s performance in all three functions. The following 
sections then focus in detail on the three key central challenges to the WTO and related reform 
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proposals. The third section starts with a discussion of reform proposals to address the often-
decried democratic deficit of the WTO. The fourth section zeroes in on the functionality challenge. 
Since the Doha Round has been stalling, the WTO faces criticisms of being inefficient and 
ineffective in managing the multilateral trade regime. The section discusses proposals to enhance 
the performance of the WTO as an administrator and adjudicator of an evolving and increasingly 
complex multilateral trade regime. The fifth section discusses – what may be called – the ‘regime 
complexity’ challenge. Faced with stalling multilateral trade negotiations, states have increasingly 
concentrated on concluding Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) and Plurilateral Agreements 
(PAs). PTAs and PAs may weaken but also strengthen the multilateral trade regime. The section 
discusses how the WTO may remain relevant in world of PTAs and PAs by ensuring that these 
agreements are ‘building’ blocks for multilateralism. The final section summarises and concludes.  
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3. Setting the scene – The crisis and WTO functions   
The legislative, executive and judicative functions of the WTO  
 
The WTO offers a comprehensive system to develop, to operate, to interpret and to enforce trade 
rules. It has three key functions (Hoekman, 2011). First, it serves as negotiating forum for 
members to develop new disciplines and to commit to market access (legislative function). The 
legislative function continuously adjusted the regime to the evolving world economy. The 
legislative function has traditionally been the core activity and most visible function of the WTO.  
 
The WTO, moreover, administers the daily operation of the multilateral trade regime (executive 
function). The WTO Secretariat and the members maintain a system of Committees. The 
Committees monitor members’ trade policies inter alia through the Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM). They also serve as platforms for peer learning, regulatory cooperation and 
notifications of PTAs or trade-related technical, sanitary or phytosanitary measures. The 
Committees thus ensure internal transparency and disseminate information about members’ 
compliance with WTO law.  
 
Finally, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) offers a mechanism to resolve in an orderly 
fashion trade conflicts between members (judicative function). If one or several members 
consider trade policy measures of another member to violate WTO law and commitments, they 
can call on a neutral panel to assess compliance and – in case of non-compliance – to authorise 
retaliatory tariffs. The DSB existed already under the GATT regime. The WTO Agreement (1994), 
however, significantly strengthened the DSB notably through the creation of an Appellate Body 
(AB). The DSB has thereby evolved into a standing global trade court, which not only engages in 
dispute resolution but arguably also in rule-making through the extensive re-interpretation of 
existing WTO norms.  
 
Manifestations of the crisis in the WTO’s functions   
 
The WTO and the multilateral trade regime face a legitimacy and effectiveness crisis. Critiques 
challenge the WTO’s legitimacy and ability to regulate global trade. The crisis manifests itself in 
all three WTO functions. The WTO’s crisis is most visible in its legislative function. The inability of 
the WTO members to conclude the Doha Round after 15 years of costly negotiations is widely seen 
as an major defeat of the organisation and its regime.  
 
The crisis also affects the WTO’s executive function in manifold ways. As states question the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the WTO, they spend fewer resources and put less effort into 
Committee work. Instead states redirect their trade policy efforts into regional and plurilateral 
fora and initiatives, which further undermine the standing of the WTO as the central forum and 
organisation in the multilateral trade regime.  
 
Finally, the crisis affects the DSB in three important regards. As critiques challenge the legitimacy 
of the WTO, they also challenge the legitimacy and fairness of the DSB to evaluate and judge 
national trade policy measures. Dispute resolution mechanisms, however, require legitimacy and 
broad acceptance to be effective in orderly resolving conflicts. Second, the failure of the Doha 
Round means that primary WTO law does not develop in parallel with the realities of global trade 
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(Wolf, 2016). In consequence, the DSB increasingly struggles to deal with today’s disputes. WTO 
primary law is increasingly out-dated to resolve disputes. Finally, in light of the collapse of the 
Doha Round WTO members sign PTAs with dispute resolution mechanisms (Stoler, 2016). The 
DSBs established under PTAs may in the long run replace the WTO DSB.  
 
Mapping the causes of the current crisis 
 
The causes of the current crisis of the multilateral trade regime are highly diverse. At the risk of 
oversimplifying, one may nonetheless distinguish three major causes underlying the WTO’s crisis: 
global systemic, structural-substantive, and institutional design causes. The following paragraphs 
give a non-exhaustive brief overview of the main causes behind the WTO crisis.   
 
Changes in the global political economy: One central cause behind today’s crisis of the 
multilateral trade regime are fundamental changes in the global political economy. The OECD 
economies lose economic weight, whereas certain developing countries such as China, India and 
Brazil become ever more important players in the world economy (Elsig, 2016). Small developing 
and least developed countries are also becoming more assertive as a group in WTO negotiations. 
The number of ‘veto’ players thus increases. At the same time, the preferences of WTO members 
have become more heterogeneous. WTO members for instance disagree over the question of 
which new policy domains to bring under the scope of WTO rules; which developing and emerging 
countries should still enjoy special and differentiated treatment; or to what extent least developed 
countries should benefit from tariff elimination. The changes significantly complicate the 
conclusion of multilateral negotiations as a single undertaking and by consensus. In consequence, 
the WTO fails to produce new market access commitments and limits the interest of businesses 
in WTO work. WTO law, moreover, stagnates and fails to adjust to the evolving realities of global 
trade (Warwick Commission, 2007). WTO rules are hardly tailored to a world of Global Value 
Chains (GVCs) and internet-based trade for instance. The inertia in the WTO results in a surge in 
PTAs and PAs, which risks further undermining multilateralism (Warwick Commission, 2007).  
 
The evolving substance of trade policy: The evolving nature of trade policy also contributes to 
the problems of the multilateral trade regime. Countries have significantly lowered classic trade 
barriers through negotiated and unilateral efforts during the last decades. Many countries have 
reached their ‘soft spot’ and are unwilling or unable to go further. The greatest potential for 
further market opening lies in the removal of so-called non-tariff barriers (NTBs) through 
regulatory cooperation (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009, p. 52). Differences in regulations and 
standards across economies impose high – in many cases unnecessary – costs on traders and 
consumers. The removal of NTBs and regulatory cooperation are intrusive. They interfere with 
domestic regulatory activities and public policy. Many countries lack the administrative capacities 
to meaningfully engage in regulatory cooperation. Other countries are unwilling to engage in 
regulatory cooperation in general and in the WTO in particular. It is indeed problematic for the 
prospects of multilateralism that regulatory cooperation requires high levels of trust between 
involved regulators. Trust, however, is more likely to prevail in regional and bilateral rather than 
multilateral settings.  
 
Weaknesses in the institutional design of the WTO: Last but not least, the crisis reflects 
weaknesses in the institutional setup and functioning of the WTO. The WTO is often criticised for 
being ineffective, inefficient and lacking legitimacy. Its institutional weaknesses affect its 
 10 
negotiating, management and judicative function. Critiques stress that the institutional setup of 
the WTO for instance failed to provide effective leadership and agenda setting, which resulted in 
a failure to build a broad consensus and ultimately triggered the collapse of the Doha Round. The 
limited involvement of non-state actors arguably amplified these dynamics. Institutional 
weaknesses are also seen to limit the effectiveness of Committee work. Already the Sutherland 
Report (Sutherland et al., 2004)  and the Warwick Commission (2007) cautioned that a stronger 
WTO Secretariat in terms of research capacity could boost the productivity of the Committees to 
monitor compliance and to further develop the WTO regime. Also the Committees themselves are 
seen as having too limited mandates, which hinders them to play a more forward-looking role. 
They barely pay attention to the role of private regulators in GVCs and have an overly narrow 
membership. While many Committees deal with regulatory questions, they do not involve 
regulators. Finally, the institutional weaknesses of the DSB are subject to a long-lasting and an 
intense policy debate. The failure of the Doha Round and the consequent stagnation of WTO law 
for instance raises questions over the ability of the DSB to deal modern trade disputes. The rise of 
PTAs and PAs, moreover, challenges the DSB’s standing as central dispute resolution institution. 
Non-state actors, furthermore, criticise their limited access to proceedings. Businesses thus show 
limited interest in the DSB whereas non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and citizens criticise 
its limited legitimacy and accountability.  
 
Implications for reforming the WTO  
 
The brief non-exhaustive assessment of the causes of the WTO’s crisis offers some guidance on 
reinvigorating the multilateral trade regime. Some causes of the crisis – such as the changes in the 
global political economy – are clearly of structural nature and defy policy intervention. Other 
causes come under political discretion. Policy-makers can in particular address the institutional 
weaknesses of the WTO to resolve some of the current problems of the multilateral trade regime. 
A better functioning organisation should increase the legitimacy and accountability of the WTO. 
And it should ensure the WTO’s continued relevance, effectiveness and efficiency in terms of 
developing and managing the trade regime as well as adjudicating modern trade policy disputes. 
As multilateral negotiations are unlikely to succeed in the near future, institutional reforms must 
in particular strengthen the executive and judicative function of the WTO in order to operate and 
to adjust the regime to the evolving realities of global trade.   
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4. The democracy challenge  
 
The Seattle Ministerial Meeting of 1999 was a watershed for the WTO and the multilateral trade 
regime. NGOs, trade unions and citizens forcefully – and in part even violently – took their 
discontent with the WTO and multilateral trade regime to the streets. Despite the WTO’s global 
membership and its focus on consensus with all countries having a veto, they criticised the WTO 
for being undemocratic, opaque, unaccountability and serving the interest of big business rather 
than citizens (Hoekman, 2011, p. 2). In the aftermath of Seattle, the WTO undertook various steps 
to address such criticisms. It has started organising regular information sessions for non-
stakeholders. It has facilitated and accelerated access to WTO documents. Yet, concerns over the 
WTO’s lacking democratic legitimacy and accountability have increased rather than decreased 
during the last decade.  
 
This section discusses proposals, which may increase the legitimacy of the WTO. Legitimacy is 
understood as “…a socially sanctioned obligation to comply with […] policies even if these violate the 
actor's own interests or normative preferences, and even if official sanctions could be avoided at low 
cost...“ (Scharpf, 2003). The section primarily focuses on proposals, which can enhance ‘input’ 
legitimacy. Input legitimacy is based on process and ensures representativeness and 
accountability of policy-making (government by the people). ‘Output’ legitimacy, on the other 
hand, stems from policy results (government for the people). Policy actors draw legitimacy from 
producing effective and efficient policy outcomes. Proposals to ensure and to enhance output 
legitimacy form the subject of the then following section.  
 
How to make the WTO more democratic and accountable?  
 
Creating standing Advisory Councils: The insufficient involvement of non-state stakeholders 
has long been identified as weakness of the WTO. Eckhard (2016) and Elsig (2016) propose in 
their E15 contributions to create standing advisory councils to enhance the participation of 
important stakeholders such as businesses, trade unions and NGOs in WTO affairs. Such standing 
advisory councils may serve a number of purposes. First, they may increase the legitimacy of WTO 
work and measures as stakeholders get ex ante access to policy-makers. Second, they facilitate the 
flow of information between regulators and regulatees of the multilateral trade regime. 
Businesses, trade unions and NGOs often hold important technical expertise and can provide first-
hand feedback on multilateral disciplines, PTAs and national policies. Advisory councils may 
thereby ensure ex post accountability of WTO work and measures and rekindle the interest of 
businesses and NGOs in the WTO. The business community in particular has been losing interest 
in the WTO during the last two decades, which is likely to negatively affect WTO work (Hoekman 
and Kostecki, 2009, p. 642). The creation of standing advisory councils begs a number of practical 
questions in need of consideration: 1) Should advisory councils be organised around economic 
sectors, WTO agreements or actor categories? And what are the costs and benefits of different 
types of formations? 2) How to select members of advisory councils? 2) And how many members 
should there be to ensure representativeness? 
 
As Eckhard (2016), Elsig (2016) and others (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009, pp. 642–644; Quick, 
2007, pp. 109–112) observe, the WTO indeed stands out as one of the few international 
organisations and regimes, which has no institutionalised relation with stakeholders- Other 
international organisations or global policy-making fora such as the OECD (BIAC, TUAC), G20 
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(B20), ASEAN (ASEAN BAC), World Bank (PSLO) and most UN organisations have standing 
advisory councils or an accreditation and outreach service to liaise with business, trade unions, 
NGOs or academia. After initial hesitation the WTO has become more open in the last years (Etsy, 
1998; Quick, 2007, pp. 109–110), but it has nonetheless not yet found a transparent, 
institutionalised way of including stakeholders into its work.   
 
Institutionalising public consultations: In the aftermaths of the Seattle Ministerial, the WTO 
sought to better involve stakeholders. A core group of NGOs and other non-state actors has 
emerged, which regularly interacts with the WTO and have thereby de facto become part of the 
‘WTO machinery’. Elsig (2013) briefly touches in a E15 contribution on the possibility to introduce 
public consultation mechanisms to reach out beyond the ‘usual suspects’. Public consultations 
may increase WTO legitimacy and accountability in the context of negotiations and Committee 
work. Consultations may help in particular stakeholders from states with opaque or dysfunctional 
governance systems to get heard at the global level. What is more, consultations may be helpful 
to reach out beyond Geneva-based NGOs and give consideration to concerns of ‘real outsiders’. 
Using public consultations is, however, also a challenging task. First, consultations are resource-
intensive. WTO members would have to ensure that the WTO Secretariat has sufficient resources 
to manage public consultations and to analyse the submissions. The European Commission, for 
instance, received almost 150.000 submissions in response to its public consultation on investor-
to-state dispute settlement (ISDS) under the planed Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP) (European Commission, 2015). Even for major administrations, the analysis 
of such a high numbers of submissions is a daunting task. Second, public consultations may 
strengthen the voice of well-resourced actors and further marginalise weak actors in policy-
making. Public consultations require a proactive outreach strategy to ensure that small, weak and 
vulnerable constituencies get heard.  
 
Rethinking the role of national parliaments: While E15 work only in passing considers 
strengthening the role of national parliaments in the WTO, a number of scholars have discussed 
this important matter in greater detail (Bellmann and Gerster, 1996; Mann, 2005; Shaffer, 2004; 
Steger, 2009). Trade policy and WTO work used to focus on classic ‘on-the-border’ trade barriers 
such as tariffs and quotas. Trade policy and WTO work have, however, evolved and focus 
increasingly on the removal of so-called non-tariff-barriers (NTBs) of regulatory and legislative 
nature through regulatory cooperation. Trade policy and WTO work thereby reach deep into the 
domestic political space, where parliaments typically play a decisive role.  As trade policy and 
WTO work become more intrusive, interfere with domestic public policy and regulation, 
parliaments may have to play a more systematic and direct role in WTO negotiations and 
Committee deliberations.  
  
Parliamentary involvement and oversight of WTO affairs may take various forms. It is for instance 
conceivable to formalise and to strengthen the role of the ‘International Parliamentary Conference 
on the WTO’ in WTO negotiations and Committee work. The Conference is a network of 
parliamentarians established under the auspices of the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 2001. It 
meets regularly in Geneva to discuss grand developments in the multilateral trade regime. 
Bellman and Gerster (1996) moreover propose the creation of a ‘WTO Parliament’. They suggest 
that national parliaments should send delegates to such a transnational body to monitor and to 
deliberate about WTO affairs.  
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Proposals for greater parliamentary involvement in WTO affairs may constitute an important 
building block for increasing the democratic legitimacy, accountability and domestic ownership 
of WTO measures. There are, however, also downsides to such proposals. First, experiences from 
the European Union suggest that parliamentary oversight or the creation of a transnational 
parliamentary body do not automatically increase democratic legitimacy and end democratic 
disconnects (Menon and Peet, 2010). Democratic legitimacy is a complex phenomenon. Second, 
greater parliamentary involvement in WTO affairs may de facto weaken the stance of developing 
and least developed countries. Parliaments of developed countries have considerable financial 
resources and may draw on extensive technical expertise for instance through parliamentary 
research services to represent their citizens in WTO affairs. Parliaments of developing and least 
developed countries lack such resources and may get side-lined in debates. Any efforts to 
strengthen parliamentary involvement in WTO affairs must make sure that less well-resourced 
parliaments get financial and technical assistance to meaningfully participate in these initiatives.  
 
How to deal with transparency in the WTO? 
 
Reviewing the WTO’s institutional strategy on external transparency: A number of E15 
contributions draw attention to the need to assess the WTO’s strategy on external transparency 
(Elsig, 2013, 2016; Mavroidis, 2016; Samans et al., 2016; Wolfe, 2015). The WTO needs to evaluate 
whether its current transparency rules are satisfactory; or whether, where and how these rules 
may need adjustment to increase legitimacy and accountability of the WTO.  
 
During the last years, transparency has become a buzzword of global economic governance and 
trade policy. NGOs, media, citizens and alike have been criticising the WTO for decades for being 
secretive and opaque. Civil society has recently advanced similar criticisms against the TTIP and 
TPP projects. The transparency question has developed into a veritable deal-breaker in the public 
debate. Civil society actors seem to generally assume that more transparency is better for policy-
making and negotiations and increases social welfare. Experience and research draw a more 
nuanced picture (See inter alia Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Grigorescu, 2003; Héritier, 2003; Perry 
and Amuelson, 1994; Prat, 2005). High degrees of transparency tend to increase legitimacy and 
accountability. Public scrutiny disciplines policy-makers, contributes to raising the quality of 
policy outcomes, improves the flow of information in polities and improves public ownership of 
policy measures. Transparency may, however, also harm society in some situations. It may 
negatively affect the behaviour of policy agents, frustrate negotiations, hinder agreement and thus 
ultimately reduce social welfare. If negotiations are fully transparent for instance, parties may feel 
unable to engage in open and frank discussions about viable options and instead stick to political 
rhetoric to please domestic constituencies. The content of policy-making and negotiations may, 
moreover, be sensitive. States and non-state actors may feel uncomfortable to make certain 
information publically available and thus try to avoid action.  
 
The WTO’s strategy on external transparency must reflect these contradictory effects and adjust 
the level of transparency to the three functions of the organisation to maximise welfare. First, Elsig 
(2013, 2016) recognises in his E15 contributions the general need for negotiations behind closed 
doors but cautions that some negotiations may indeed take place in public with parliaments, NGOs 
and alike observing discussions. Second, Elsig (2013, 2016) stresses that greater transparency 
would benefit the WTO’s executive function. Many WTO Committees deal with standards, 
regulations and regulatory cooperation. Immediate and easy access to relevant WTO documents, 
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observation or even participation in discussions of WTO Committees may lead to better outcomes. 
Finally, Samans et al. (Samans et al., 2016) suggest that there might also be a case for increasing 
transparency in the WTO’s judicative function. DSB panels may benefit in terms of legitimacy and 
access to information from an interested public. Stakeholders may observe, gain access to some 
DSB documents and submit positions (see Amicus Curiae in ISDS) to the panel. In short, 
transparency is an important and complex matter. E15 work highlights that the WTO needs to 
reassess whether, where and how much transparency it wants.  
 
WTO web presence and access to WTO documentation: While not subject of E15 reflection, a 
first step toward a more transparent WTO would be to facilitate navigation on its website to 
increase transparency for laymen. Stakeholders – unfamiliar with the WTO system – find it 
difficult to navigate the website and to find relevant documents. Even though the WTO may de 
jure provide access to information, it remains de facto inaccessible to stakeholders. The situation 
risks creating the impression that WTO is secretive and its work inaccessible for non-expert.  
 
Streamlining official WTO documentation:  In a similar vein, stakeholders at times complain 
about the technical language and format of WTO documents. If laymen manage to find documents, 
they may struggle to understand them. In consequence, laymen have problems to follow WTO 
work and to understand its impact on them. The situation again propels criticism that the WTO is 
secretive. While it is clear that many aspects of WTO work are highly technical and thus require 
complex language and documentation, the WTO may reflect on how to make information more 
accessible in terms of language and format.  
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Table 4.1: SWOT analysis of addressing the democracy challenge  
 
Strengths 
 
 Consensus decision-making  
 All countries have a veto right 
 Global membership  
 
Opportunities 
 
 Increased legitimacy  
 Greater policy ownership  
 Better flow of information 
 Increased policy quality  
  
Weaknesses 
 
 Despite intrusive policies, no direct 
parliamentary involvement 
 No institutionalised relationship with 
non-state actors  
 Growing discontent with limited 
transparency and access 
 
Threats 
 
 Growing number of political veto players 
 De facto overrepresentation of developed 
countries  
 Selection bias in choice of non-state 
actors granted participation in WTO 
 Overly burdensome consultations 
 Policy paralysis through too much 
transparency 
 
5. The functionality challenge  
 
E15 experts identify a number of institutional weaknesses, which negatively affect the WTO’s 
negotiating, management and judicative function. The weaknesses undermine the effectiveness 
and efficiency of the WTO. In short, the ‘output’ legitimacy of the WTO is put into question. The 
following section discusses weaknesses and related reform proposals to enhance the efficiency 
and effectiveness of the WTO as a negotiating platform, regime manager and dispute settlement 
forum. 
 
How to ensure effective and fair leadership?  
 
Overcoming the intricacies of WTO decision-making: Policy-makers and academics argue that 
the member-driven functioning of the WTO in combination with the ‘single undertaking’ and 
consensus principle hinder effective and efficient policy-making (Cottier and Elsig, 2011; Elsig, 
2013). As all WTO members hold a veto and block through a veto the overall negotiating process 
across all policy domains, progress in WTO negotiations is extremely difficult. Abbott (2013) and 
Elsig (2013, 2016) thus discuss ideas to reform the WTO’s decision-making rules to facilitate 
negotiations as well as Committee work. Proposals to streamline decision-making in the WTO 
have been under discussion for many years (see Hoekman, 2011). Abbott (2013) and Elsig (2013, 
2016) both argue that a move from consensus decision-making to qualified majority or weighted 
voting may improve effectiveness and efficiency of WTO decision-making. They – implicitly or 
explicitly – caution however that a reform of decision-making may be extremely difficult. As Pascal 
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Lamy noted, there is consensus on consensus among WTO membership (Hoekman, 2011, p. 9; 
Lamy, 2009). Despite the well-known problems with decision-making and consensus rules, WTO 
membership seems unwilling to move away from the status quo. In particular, small developing 
and least developed countries strongly oppose plans to introduce qualified majority or weighted 
voting. Hoekman (2011) moreover advances functional arguments for maintaining the consensus 
principle. Modern trade policy is often of regulatory nature. WTO measures need to be transposed 
and enforced through domestic regulators. Domestic regulators are typically highly independent 
agencies. They are unlikely to transpose and to enforce WTO measures, if their concerns are not 
reflected in these measures. Consensus promotes policy ownership necessary for effective 
policies. Elsig (2013, 2016) therefore suggests that 1) greater leadership either through 
designated WTO members or the WTO Secretariat as well as 2) a move away from the ‘single 
undertaking’ principle through PAs may constitute more promising step toward effective and 
efficient policy-making in the WTO than a review of decision-making rules.  
 
Creating an ‘executive’ Committee: Many factors contributed to the collapse of the Doha Round. 
A lack in leadership is widely seen as one important factor. Abbott (2013) and Elsig (2013, 2016) 
propose in their E15 contributions the creation of an executive Committee, which should provide 
guidance in future negotiations but also in the continuous operation of the WTO.  
 
Abbott (2013) observers in his E15 piece that four groups of countries structure the global 
political economy: developed/OECD economies; emerging markets; developing economies; and 
least developed economies. An executive Committee would need to encompass members from all 
four groups in order to ensure that the different concerns of these groups are reflected. The 
Committee should meet to freely discuss the broad strategies and future of the WTO, to lead and 
oversee multilateral and plurilateral negotiating efforts and to give impetus to Committee work. 
Abbott stresses that further reflection is needed to determine 1) the powers of the Committee, 2) 
the rules to recruit members; 3) the background of members (ambassadors or policy-makers from 
capitals), 4) the size of the Committee and 5) the duration of membership.  
 
Elsig (2016) adds in his E15 Policy Options Paper that such an executive Committee should 
coordinate attempts for a so-called ‘early harvest’. The Doha Round failed, as it was impossible to 
close all negotiating chapters. WTO members were nonetheless able to come to agreement in 
several domains. Due to the principle of a ‘single undertaking’ – nothing is agreed, until everything 
is agreed – these partial agreements could not be realised. They were not transposed into binding 
commitments. WTO members seek to ‘rescue’ such partial agreements inter alia through plans for 
Plurilateral agreements (PAs). An executive Committee could lead and coordinate this task and 
ensure that 15 years of negotiations were not in vain.  
 
How to enhance the contribution of the Secretariat to WTO work?  
 
The Secretariat as agenda setter: Elsig’s Synthesis Report on the Functioning of the WTO (2016) 
as well as the Sutherland Report (Sutherland et al., 2004) observe that WTO negotiations and 
Committee work suffer not only from a lack in leadership but also from suboptimal agenda setting. 
Adding or subtracting agenda items may increase or decrease the prospects for agreement 
(Hoekman, 2011; Odell, 2000, 2013). It has been argued that the collapse of the Doha Round is 
inter alia due to ineffective agenda setting. In the WTO, the chairs of Committees and working 
parties normally set the agenda. Chairs – officials from WTO members – may lack the long-term 
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and global overlook and technical expertise to ensure effective agenda setting. The E15 Synthesis 
Report on the Functioning of the WTO thus proposes strengthening the Secretariat as an agenda 
setter in negotiations and Committee work to ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency. The 
WTO Secretariat may be better placed to ensure effective and fair agenda setting and thereby 
facilitate agreement and effective Committee work.  
 
Enhance the Secretariat’s research and data collection capacity: Several E15 Synthesis 
Reports (Elsig, 2016; Samans et al., 2016), the Sutherland Report (Sutherland et al., 2004), the 
Warwick Commission (2007) and Pascal Lamy (2009) recommend strengthening the Secretariat’s 
research and data collection capacity to promote effective and efficient policy-making. They 
develop the vision of the WTO as an institution, which provides data on trade policy, trade flows 
and scientific analysis and advice to members. The underlying rationale is that information and 
scientific analysis facilitate negotiations, Committee work and dispute resolution. The Secretariat 
may thereby enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the WTO’s functions. The WTO has been 
moving in this direction. Its research and data collection capacity is, nonetheless, still limited in 
comparison to other international organisations such as the OECD, IMF or World Bank. Reflection 
is needed on how to develop the WTO’s research and data collection capacity in view of creating 
synergies for WTO members rather than duplicating exiting capacities in the mentioned 
organisations. Samans et al. (2016) emphasise in particular that the WTO should intensify its 
collaboration with the OECD to collect and analysis data on the integration of services and goods 
trade as part of Global Value Chains.   
 
How to enhance the contribution of WTO Committees to WTO work?  
 
Reviewing the Secretariat and Committee structure: The structure of the Secretariat and the 
Committee system may be ill-adjusted and out-dated limiting the effectiveness and efficiency of 
Committee work. The Committees operate the multilateral trade regime (executive function). 
They oversee notifications, elaborate norms, conduct trade policy reviews and accession 
processes (Wijkström, 2015). As the multilateral negotiations are paralysed and the focus of trade 
policy shifts away from bargaining over market access toward regulatory cooperation, the 
Committees are bound to acquire ever-greater importance for the multilateral trade regime. 
Several E15 contributions explicitly or implicitly propose reviewing the Secretariat and the WTO’s 
Committee system (see figure 5.1) (Elsig, 2016; Samans et al., 2016; Stephenson, 2016, p. 15; 
Vickers, 2014, p. 15; Wijkström, 2015).  
 
Elsig (2016) and Wijkström (2015) suggest in their E15 contributions that it might be necessary 
to rethink the existing Committee system in order to tab on its full potential. As Samans (2016) 
and Stephenson (2016) note, the review may lead to the creation of new Committees – for instance 
for eCommerce or Global Value Chains – and the disposal of nowadays less relevant Committees. 
Wijkström (2015) proposes to extend the work focus of the TBT and SPS Committee to new 
domains including private regulation and standards. A review might ensure that the limited 
resources of WTO members and the Secretariat are optimally used. What is more, it might be 
helpful to rethink the structure of the WTO Secretariat in view of catering to Committee work. As 
Committees become more important, it is key to ensure that the Secretariat supports to the fullest 
extent possible Committee work through data, analysis and agenda setting.  
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Strengthen the brainstorming capacity of Committees: As multilateral trade rounds are 
unlikely to succeed in the foreseeable future, the Committees will need to play a more creative 
and conceptual part in developing the multilateral trade future. The contributions of Elsig (2016), 
Wijkström (2015), Samans et al. (2016) and others (See Hoekman, 2011; Sutherland et al., 2004; 
Warwick Commission, 2007) propose to reconceive the WTO’s Committees as creative 
brainstorming platforms rather than management entities. They suggest giving Committees the 
freedom and resources to be forward-looking. Committees may for instance start organising 
workshops and commission research.  
 
Getting domestic regulators to lead regulatory cooperation: Wijkström (2015) and Elsig 
(2016) observe in their E15 contributions that most WTO members send trade policy officials to 
WTO Committees. It might, however, be important to open up participation in WTO work to other 
parts of national administrations such as lead ministries, parliaments or regulators. Two 
considerations inform this recommendation. First, many Committees – such as the TBT and SPS 
Committee – engage in regulatory cooperation and norm development. They seek to disseminate 
information about domestic regulation and regulatory systems, to promote regulatory 
convergence and to elaborate international norms. The technicality of the task may require expert 
participation to ensure that WTO measures are of high quality in terms of effectiveness and 
efficiency. Second, regulators are typically highly independent agencies. Their mandates require 
them to pursue specific social objectives such as public health, environmental or labour 
protection, transport safety and alike. Economic and trade considerations, which dominate 
deliberations in WTO Committees, are typically not part of their mandate (Basedow and 
Kauffmann, 2016). Regulators are unlikely to transpose and to enforce WTO decisions and 
measures, if they do not see their mandates and concerns reflected. Trade policy-makers need to 
ensure that regulators take ownership and lead regulatory cooperation in the WTO Committee 
work. An insufficient involvement of regulators is likely to fall short of expectations.   
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Figure 5.1 Organogram of WTO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Source: WTO (2017).
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How to ensure that WTO measures are effective and efficient?  
 
Promote Good Regulatory Practices: Mavroidis (2016), Arvíus and Jachia (2015), Malyshev and 
Kauffmann (2015) and Wolfe (2015) share the view that the WTO and WTO members may 
intensify their use of Good Regulatory Practices (GRP). GRP promote high quality regulation. High 
quality regulation is by definition trade-friendly as it minimises unnecessary social and economic 
costs including trade costs. In the absence of multilateral trade rounds and new market access 
commitments, the widespread systemic use of GRP in the WTO and in WTO members may prevent 
regulatory trade barriers and partly fill the void left by the collapse of the Doha Round. GRP 
encompass three public management tools: regulatory impact assessments (RIA), ex post 
evaluations, and stakeholder consultations (OECD, 2012). Regulators use RIA to ex ante assess the 
likely effects of planned measures – and alternatives – on society. Ex post evaluation scrutinise 
whether existing measures serve their purpose and impose minimal costs on society. Stakeholder 
consultation are often part of RIA and ex post evaluations. They seek to increase the legitimacy of 
regulation and to mainstream concerns of stakeholders in the norm elaboration and evaluation 
process (see section 4). GRP may – if rightly designed – enable the WTO and WTO members to 
weigh and balance social, economic and trade benefits and costs in the development and 
implementation of norms.  
 
The WTO – as an institution – may step up its use of GRP. The WTO’s TBT and SPS Committees 
already use stakeholder consultations to identify trade effects of national regulation. WTO 
members shall notify the Committees of new measures in order to give other WTO members 
possibility to consult domestically and to eventually raise objections against unnecessarily trade-
restricting measures (Basedow and Kauffmann, 2016, p. 10; Wijkström, 2015). The Committees 
may extend their focus from regulation to standards. They may, moreover, start periodically 
reviewing notified regulations and standards in view assessing their trade impact (Wijkström, 
2015). The WTO may, moreover, institutionalise ex ante assessments and ex post evaluations to 
analyse the likely and actual effects of multilateral and plurilateral trade agreements. So far only 
major WTO members undertake such studies. WTO assessments may help to locate zones of 
agreement and strike more equitable deals. Experience from the European Union context, 
however, suggest that transnational assessments may rekindle redistributive conflicts and may 
also hinder agreement.  
 
As Mavoridis (2016) and Wolfe (2015) propose, the WTO may seek to promote, harmonise and 
benchmark the use of GRP among its members. While GRP are standard in OECD countries, non-
OECD countries do not systemically use GRP (OECD, 2015). When promoting GRP, the WTO should 
focus on three key aspects (Basedow and Kauffmann, 2016): 1) The WTO should recommend the 
use of RIA and the mainstreaming of trade considerations in RIA guidelines. Most importantly, the 
WTO should encourage its members to systematically use international regulation and standards 
where possible. 2) The WTO should encourage the use of ex post evaluations. Trade impacts of 
regulation are often unintended and unexpected and therefore only show after implementation. 
3) The WTO should encourage members to use stakeholder consultations, which are open to all 
affected parties including foreign traders. 
 
Strengthen the GVC focus of the WTO: One of the most important developments of the last 
decades in global trade has been the rise of GVCs. WTO rules are out-dated and underperform 
when it comes to facilitating GVC trade. The E15 Synthesis Report on Global Value Chains (GVCs) 
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by Stephenson (2016) suggests that the WTO needs to afford greater attention to the specific 
policy challenges tied to GVCs to remain relevant. The main hurdles to GVC trade are regulatory 
frictions. Stephenson (2016) and Hoekman (2015) propose several measures to facilitate 
regulatory cooperation in view of facilitating GVC trade. The WTO could start collecting GVC-
related data to better understand relevant trade barriers. It might create a platform or 
‘clearinghouse’ to facilitate information sharing and contact among stakeholders involved in 
supply chains. It might hold an annual GVC conference and setup so-called Supply Chain Councils 
(SCC). SCCs would bring together businesses, regulators, trade policy-makers and other 
stakeholders to regularly discuss GVC-related issues. The WTO – as a platform for SCCs – could 
make an important contribution to the multilateral trade regime, businesses and development.  
  
Realising the potential of transnational private regulation: Regulatory trade barriers do not 
only stem from public regulation. Private regulation and standards play a crucial role notably in 
GVC trade. Mavroidis (2016), Arvíus and Jachia (2015), Thorstensen, Weissinger and Xinhua 
(2015) and Wijkström (2015) alike recommend that the WTO assess how to tab on the potential 
of private measures to promote trade and regulatory coherence. So far the WTO’s efforts to 
promote regulatory coherence only focus on public regulation and regulators. The WTO may need 
to intensify cooperation with private regulators to promote regulatory coherence and to facilitate 
trade. Wijkström (2015) therefore proposes to extend the focus of the TBT and SPS Committees 
to relevant private measures.  
 
How to ensure the effectiveness of the Dispute Settlement Body?  
 
Dealing with the stagnation of primary WTO law: Wolf (2016) notes in his E15 contribution 
that the legal basis for the DSB to resolve trade conflicts is increasingly out-dated and risks 
becoming irrelevant for modern disputes. The DSB is widely considered as a major success story. 
The collapse of the Doha Round, however, implies that WTO law may not develop at the same 
speed as the economic realities of global trade. Wolf emphasises in his piece that the DSB may 
delay and limit the negative consequence of the failure of the Doha Round by exhausting its 
interpretative leeway for existing WTO norms. Trade conflicts relating to eCommerce for instance 
may get resolved on the basis of GATS norms. Wolf cautions, however, that generic norms may 
not be sufficiently specific for dealing with the particularities of the economic phenomenon and 
allow for fair rulings. What is more, it is unclear whether DSB panels have enough legitimacy to 
engage in far-ranging interpretative exercises. In short, the DSB will have to carefully balance the 
need to remain relevant through the application of existing primary law to new types of conflict; 
and eventual criticisms of overstepping its mandate and interpretative leeway. An open 
discussion among WTO members about the role of the DSB in rule-making may be needed.  
 
Strengthening the role of non-state actors to enhance transparency: Some E15 experts have 
mentioned the possibility to strengthen the role of non-state actors in the WTO in general and in 
the DSB in particular (Eckhardt, 2016; Elsig, 2016; Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2000; Samans et al., 
2016). The Warwick Commission (2007) prominently argued in favour of strengthening the role 
of non-state actors in DSB proceedings to enhance transparency, legitimacy and effectiveness. In 
line with such recommendations, so-called ‘amicus curiae’ letters were gradually allowed in DSB 
proceedings (Hoekman, 2011, p. 15). ‘Amicus curiae’ submissions enable private parties to submit 
their views, share their expertise and information with a DSB panel and states. ‘Amicus curiae’ 
submissions enhance transparency and the flow of information between policy-makers, panellists 
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and stakeholders. They are seen to strengthen the interests of developing and least developed 
countries and to give non-economic social and environmental considerations greater weight in 
the DSB proceedings (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 2000, pp. 529–530). Further thought might be 
given to the question of how to strengthen access of non-state actors to the DSB.  
 
Anchoring the DSB in a complex global trade regime: Stoler (2016) and Vickers (2014) draw 
attention to an important challenge to the WTO DSB in his E15 contribution. In the coming years, 
PTAs and PAs are likely to be the main instrument of countries to pursue their trade policy 
objectives and thus to further develop international trade law. The multiplication of dispute 
settlement bodies under PAs and PTAs risks geographically fragmenting international trade law 
and creating inconsistent interpretations of norms. These developments might impose 
considerable costs on the world economy. It is crucial to ensure that the WTO DSB will continue 
to be the key instance for the interpretation of international trade law in an increasingly complex 
trade regime. Stoler (2016) formulates several proposals to ensure that the WTO DSB may 
continue to play a central role.  WTO members should design PTAs in view of maintaining a central 
position for the WTO DSB. Even though PTAs normally provide for their own DSB, they should 
allow parties to choose their preferred legal venue. In other words, if a trade conflict between 
parties primarily relates to WTO norms, the claimant party should be allowed to call on the WTO 
DSB. PTAs should also make it a legal obligation on their DSBs to consider WTO jurisprudence in 
order to maintain legal coherence. While Stoler (2016) does not discuss the standing of the WTO 
DSB under PAs in his piece, it follows from his reasoning that the WTO DSB should be the instance 
to resolve trade dispute arising under these agreements.  The advantage would be, moreover, that 
the WTO DSB could develop international trade law on the basis of more up-to-date sources. PAs 
are likely to cover new salient trade issues such as eCommerce and alike. The DSB might thereby 
build up a jurisprudence regarding new salient trade policy issues and uphold the importance of 
WTO law.  
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Figure 5.1: SWOT analysis of addressing the functionality challenge  
 
Strengths 
 
 Member-driven agenda setting 
 Policy-ownership of negotiated and 
Committee outputs due to consensus rule 
 Fairly good track record in Committee 
work 
 Effective and well-accepted dispute 
settlement capacity 
 
Opportunities 
 
 Secretariat as neutral and research-led 
leader of WTO work  
 Transforming Committees into creative 
and forward-looking entities to develop 
multilateral trade regime  
 Enhance global and domestic governance 
through Good Regulatory Practices  
 Increasing efficiency of regulatory 
cooperation through incorporations of 
private initiatives 
 Increase fairness in access and use of 
dispute settlement leading to better 
global compliance with WTO law 
 Allowing dispute settlement mechanism 
to play a role under PTAs and PAs 
maintains its role as central interpreting 
authority of WTO law 
 
Weaknesses 
 
 Ineffective and little forward-thinking 
agenda setting in negotiations and 
Committee work 
 Lack in forward-looking leadership  
 Difficult decision-making due to 
consensus  
 Limited stakeholder involvement and 
interest  
 No monitoring of effectiveness of outputs  
 Increasingly out-dated primary law basis 
for dispute settlement  
 Asymmetry in access and effectiveness of 
dispute settlement  
 
Threats 
 
 Erode support of states for WTO due to 
Secretariat leadership 
 Use of Good Regulatory Practices at WTO 
level might hinder agreement and action  
 Limited legitimacy of transnational 
private regulation may reflect badly on 
WTO  
 More effective dispute settlement might 
weaken state support for mechanism 
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6. The regime complexity challenge  
 
The slow death of the Doha Round has shifted the focus of international trade policy-making from 
multilateral to bilateral, regional and plurilateral negotiations. Likeminded WTO members are 
increasingly using single-issue PAs to extend the WTO regime to new salient trade policy issues. 
Examples of such PAs are the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), the Agreement on 
Government Procurement (GPA), the currently negotiated Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) 
and the recently failed initiative for an Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA). The WTO has, 
moreover, documented a tenfold increase in the number of notified PTAs since the early 1990s 
(see figure 6.1). The surge in the number of PTAs rekindles the old debate on the negative and 
positive effects of PTAs on the multilateral trade regime and the WTO (Baldwin, 2006; Bhagwati, 
1987; Heydon, 2014; Krugman, 1991; Panagariya, 1999; Viner, 1950). The challenges related to 
the growing complexity of the multilateral trade regime, however, are different than what many 
scholars predicted in past decades. Rather trade diversion, legal complexity and incoherence may 
emerge as the main problem for countries and traders.  
 
Figure 6.1: Evolution of Regional Trade Agreements in the World, 1948-2017 
 
 
Source: WTO (2017). 
 
How to make PTAs multilateral-friendly?   
 
 25 
PTA exchange: Suominen (2014), Estevadeordal et al. (2013) and Stoler (2016) discuss in their 
E15 contributions the idea of a ‘PTA exchange’ 1 . They propose that the WTO become a 
clearinghouse for all PTA-related questions. The WTO should collect information and provide 
analysis of how PTAs affect countries. The WTO should become a platform for peer learning and 
policy advise on PTAs. The underlying rationale is that PTAs may undermine but also strengthen 
the multilateral trade regime and the WTO. A PTA exchange would enable the WTO to promote 
multilateral-friendly PTAs and thereby to limit the negative fallout of the current wave of trade 
regionalism. Other international organisations are moving quickly in order to host such a PTA 
exchange. The great expertise and central position of the WTO in the multilateral trade regime 
predestine the WTO, however, to host such a platform. The international community should 
entrust the WTO with this task in order to tab on policy-making and knowledge synergies. PTAs 
might thereby at least partly fill the void left by the collapse of the Doha Round.  
 
Multilateral Impact Assessments: Lawrence (2013) proposes in his E15 piece to use a future 
‘PTA exchange’ as a platform to draft and to discuss so-called multilateral impact assessments. 
Like RIAs for domestic regulatory measures, such multilateral impact assessment would identify 
and weigh the costs and benefits of PTAs in particular with regard to their likely impacts on the 
multilateral trade regime and WTO. These impact assessments might thereby ensure that PTAs 
are ‘building’ rather than ‘stumbling’ blocks and partly replace multilateral negotiations.   
 
How to ensure that Plurilaterals strengthen the multilateral trade regime?  
 
A committee and guidelines for multilateral-friendly PAs: The declaration of the WTO 
Ministerial Meeting of December 2012 called for the exploration of new approaches to trade 
negotiations. In line with prior recommendations of the Warwick Commission, the statement was 
broadly seen as a call for single-issue plurilateral initiatives. The collapse of the Doha Round in 
2016 gave further impetus to these developments. The growing interest and dynamism in this 
field, however, warrants caution. PAs – while always second-best options compared to multi-issue 
multilateral deals – may indeed increase global welfare. But if ill-designed, they may also harm 
the world economy and undermine global welfare (Heydon, 2014, pp. 1047–1050; Hoekman, 
2012, p. 759).  
 
The E15 Synthesis Report on the Functioning of the WTO (Elsig, 2016) recommends the creation 
of a new WTO committee or working group to monitor and to develop guidelines on multilateral-
friendly PAs. The guidelines should specify under what circumstances PA initiatives within the 
multilateral trade regime are permissible. The Sutherland Report (Sutherland et al., 2004) for 
instance stipulates that PA initiatives must not bring trade issues into the WTO regime, which face 
strong opposition from a broad majority of WTO members. The E15 Synthesis Report (Elsig, 
2016), moreover, suggests that the future PA guidelines should oblige parties to design PAs in 
view of a future multilateralisation of commitments. In other words, the hurdles for interested 
WTO members – and notably developing and least developed countries – should be kept low. 
Trade disputes arising under a PA should be subject to the jurisdiction of the WTO DSB. 
Negotiations and the operation of PAs through special Committees should be transparent and 
open to non-members. This list is far from exhaustive. Yet as the Sutherland Report states PAs 
                                                             
1 The authors refer to it as ‘RTA exchange’. RTA stands for regional trade agreement and is here used 
interchangeably with the abbreviation PTA.  
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must be legitimate, transparent and inclusive in order to strengthen rather than to undermine the 
multilateral trade regime (Sutherland et al., 2004).   
 
PA coordination: E15 deliberations have not focused on questions of coordination across PA 
initiatives. There is, however, a manifest risk that mushrooming PA initiatives may create norm 
overlap, duplication and incoherence. PAs typically focus on a single trade issue or sector with 
varying membership. PAs covering adjacent domains are likely to interact and to create an 
overlapping complex web of legal obligations and rights. A PA dealing with eCommerce for 
instance is likely to interact with PAs covering other types of services or high-tech goods. Legal 
complexity and incoherence is likely to harm traders, countries and the world economy. The 
above-discussed PA Committee or Executive Committee (section 4) could assume the 
responsibility to coordinate PA initiatives.  
 
Toward ‘critical mass’ or preferential PAs: As Vickers (2014) observes, the rise of PAs triggers 
the question when these agreements may apply on a MFN or preferential basis. The WTO should 
develop an evidence-based strategy to on this question. Two types of PAs exist within the 
multilateral trade regime (Hoekman, 2012, p. 759). First, so-called ‘critical mass’ PAs apply on a 
MFN basis. Critical mass PAs bring together the key economies in a domain. These economies 
commit among each other to additional market access. These commitments are extended through 
the MFN clause to non-signatories. Second, recent PA initiatives such as TiSA seem to aim for 
preferential liberalisation. The signatory countries only grant enhanced market access to other 
signatory parties. Non-signatory countries cannot benefit from enhanced market access. The 
preferential application of a PA aims at creating incentives for non-signatories to join in.  
 
Assistance to developing countries: Several E15 contributions (Estevadeordal et al., 2013; 
Suominen, 2014; Vickers, 2014) as well as the Sutherland Report (Sutherland et al., 2004) 
emphasise that developing and least developed countries may need assistance from the WTO to 
take part in and to benefit from the rise of PAs and PTAs. So far mostly developed and emerging 
economies initiate and take part in current PA initiatives. In consequence, PA initiatives reflect 
interest and capabilities of advanced economies. The market access commitments and regulatory 
provisions in PAs may, however, be challenging for developing and least developed countries to 
implement. The surge in PAs may thereby cement a two-track multilateral trade regime, which 
hinders development and growth of the poorest WTO members. Technical assistance to 
developing and least developed countries wishing to join a PA is therefore crucial and should form 
part of the WTO’s future activities.  
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Table 6.1: SWOT analysis of addressing the regime complexity challenge  
 
Strengths 
 
 WTO regime can legally accommodate 
PTAs and PAs and thereby keep door 
open for multilateralisation 
 PTAs and PAs may prepare economies for 
future multilateral efforts 
 
Opportunities 
 
 WTO can ensure through expertise and 
assistance that PTAs are multilateral-
friendly, comply with WTO law and 
promote growth and development  
 WTO can ensure that PAs strengthen 
rather than weaken multilateralism 
through developing trade law 
 WTO can help developing countries to 
take part in PA initiatives  
 
Weaknesses 
 
 PTAs de facto undermine the WTO’s 
legislative, executive and judicative 
function and intensify crisis 
 PAs weaken multilateralism and produce 
less equitable and fair outcomes  
 
 
Threats 
 
 PTAs and PAs may side-line developing 
countries and limit their prospects to 
develop through trade  
 The WTO may promote its own demise by 
adopting a welcoming stance toward 
PTAs and PAs may  
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7. Conclusion  
 
The WTO and the multilateral trade regime are a major success story of global governance. In few 
other policy domains have states cooperated as successfully and created as effective and efficient 
global institutions as in international trade policy. In part it is due to the WTO’s outstanding 
performance and success that observers see the multilateral trade regime in crisis today.  
 
The crisis of the WTO has many causes. Institutional weaknesses are one important factor. This 
study discussed the weaknesses and related reform proposals. An institutional reform may make 
an important contribution to reinvigorating and preparing the WTO and the multilateral trade 
regime for future challenges. This study focused on three key areas:  
 
1. Improve legitimacy and accountability: Despite various efforts, the WTO still faces 
broad criticism of lacking legitimacy and accountability. Involving national parliaments, 
institutionalising relations with non-state actors and introducing public consultation 
mechanisms may help to address these criticisms. The WTO moreover needs to reconsider 
its strategy on external transparency and information sharing. 
 
2. Strengthen the WTO’s executive and judicative function: The core business of the 
WTO is currently evolving. Its main task used to be multilateral trade negotiations. Due to 
changes in the global political economy and nature of trade policy, multilateral trade 
rounds are unlikely to happen or to succeed in the foreseeable future. Hence, the WTO’s 
executive and judicative function are bound to become more important. Committee work 
and dispute settlement will have to ensure open world markets and adjust WTO law to the 
evolving realities of global trade. The study proposed to strengthen the Secretariat’s role 
and to modernise the Committee system to ensure that the daily operation of the regime 
produces desired outcomes. It, moreover, stressed that WTO member need to reflect on 
how to maintain the DSB as a central dispute resolution forum in a complex trade regime.  
 
3. Transform into negotiating and knowledge platform for PTAs and PAs: The locus of 
trade policy-making has shifted from multilateral to regional and plurilateral trade 
negotiations. The WTO should redefine its institutional role and mission accordingly. 
Rather than a host for multilateral trade negotiations, it should see itself as a knowledge 
and negotiating platform for regional and plurilateral agreements. By developing basic 
principles, providing expertise and offering a well-respected dispute settlement 
mechanism, the WTO can continue to promote the ideal of multilateralism, support 
development and growth and preserve a transparent level playing field for all.  
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8. Annex: Summary tables of reform proposals 
 
Overall challenge  Concrete problem Reform proposal  Opportunities & threats  Relevant E15 paper 
Increasing the WTO’s 
legitimacy and 
accountability 
Insufficient participation and 
support for WTO work from 
non-state actors such as 
businesses, NGOs and alike.  
Create standing advisory 
councils 
+ Greater inclusiveness  
+Stronger policy ownership  
+ Better flow of information  
+ Increased policy quality  
- Risk of even more veto 
players 
- Risk of overrepresentation of 
major economies 
 Elsig, 2016 
 Eckhard, 2016 
Current non-state actors 
following WTO work have 
over time become part of the 
WTO machinery and do not 
represent real outsiders 
anymore.  
Introduce public consultation 
process 
+ Greater inclusiveness  
+ Stronger policy ownership  
+ Better flow of information  
+ Increased policy quality  
- Burdensome on 
administration 
- Difficult outreach to weak 
constituencies 
 Elsig, 2016 
Modern trade policy reaches 
deep into the domestic public 
policy space and thereby 
erodes traditional 
parliamentary control.   
Strengthen parliamentary 
involvement  
+ Greater legitimacy  
+ Greater accountability  
+ Better flow of information  
+ Increased policy quality  
- Risk of even more veto 
players 
 n/a 
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- Risk of overrepresentation of 
major economies 
The growing intrusiveness of 
modern trade policy fuels ever 
stronger demands for external 
transparency.  
Review of external 
transparency strategy 
(including WTO web presence 
and documentation)  
+ Greater legitimacy  
+ Greater accountability  
+ Better flow of information  
- Risk of overly adversarial 
negotiating behaviour  
- Risk of non-cooperation due 
to sensitive information 
 Elsig, 2013, 2016 
 Mavroidis, 2016 
 Samans et al., 2016 
 Wolfe, 2015 
 
 
Overall challenge  Concrete problem Reform proposal  Opportunities & threats  Relevant E15 paper 
Ensuring the effectiveness 
and efficiency of WTO work 
Insufficient leadership has 
arguably contributed to the 
collapse of the Doha Round 
and paralysed the WTO’s 
negotiating function.  
Create executive Committee 
for leadership  
+ Leadership enhances 
effectiveness and efficiency  
+ Opportunity to optimise 
‘early harvest’ 
- Risk of undermining 
legitimacy of WTO work 
 Abbott, 2013 
 Elsig, 2013, 2016 
 
Consensus decision-making in 
combination with the Single 
Undertaking and member-
driven functioning of the WTO 
is often seen as a key cause 
behind the collapse of the 
Doha Round.  
Review decision-making rules 
to overcome negotiating 
deadlocks  
+ Opportunity to increase 
efficiency and effectiveness of 
WTO negotiations through 
qualified or weighted voting 
- Risk of undermining 
legitimacy of WTO  
- Risk of undermining 
domestic policy ownership  
 Abbott, 2013 
 Elsig, 2013, 2016 
  
Member-driven policy-making 
has shown increasingly 
cumbersome in a WTO of 
global and very heterogeneous 
membership.    
Strengthen Secretariat as 
agenda setter  
+ Opportunity to increase 
effectiveness and efficiency of 
negotiations and committee 
work through better agendas 
 
 Elsig, 2013, 2016 
 Odell, 2013 
  
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Negotiations and Committee 
work at times suffer from a 
lack of data and analysis 
translating into stalemate.  
Enhance Secretariat’s research 
and data collection capacity  
+ Opportunity to support 
successful negotiations and 
committee work through data 
and analysis 
- Risk of duplicating research 
capacity of other IOs 
 Elsig, 2016 
 Samans et al., 2016 
The WTO’s Committee system 
and Secretariat have been 
established in the 1990s and 
may need to be updated to 
fully deliver.   
Review the Secretariat and 
Committee structure  
+ Enhance capacity of 
Secretariat to support 
committees 
+ Better use of WTO resources  
 Elsig, 2016 
 Samans et al., 2016 
 Stephenson, 2016 
 Vickers, 2014 
 Wijkström, 2015 
The WTO’s negotiating 
function is in coma translating 
into a stagnation of the WTO’s 
institutional and legal order.  
Strengthen brainstorming 
capacity of WTO Committees 
to engage in forward-looking 
deliberations.    
+ Opportunity to fill void on 
institutional development left 
by collapse of Doha Round 
 Elsig, 2016 
 Wijkström, 2015 
 Samans et al., 2016 
Modern trade barriers are of 
regulatory nature and can only 
get addressed by domestic 
regulators.  
Strengthen involvement of 
domestic regulators in 
Committee work  
+ Greater technical expertise 
+ Increased policy ownership  
 Wijkström, 2015 
 Elsig, 2016 
Many regulator trade barriers 
stem from lacking awareness 
and information on trade 
effects of regulation.  
Strengthen the use of Good 
Regulatory Practices to 
promote regulatory coherence  
+ Increase quality of WTO 
measures 
+ Increase quality of national 
measures 
- Risk of overly burdensome 
on WTO  
- Risk of lacking capacity 
among developing and least 
develpped countries 
 Mavroidis, 2016 
 Arvíus and Jachia, 2015 
 Malyshev and Kauffmann, 
2015 
 Wolfe, 2015 
  
A growing share of trade takes 
place as part of GVCs, which 
poses distinct challenges than 
classic trade flows.  
Strengthen the GVC focus of 
WTO work to  
+ Supply Chain Councils 
increase business support for 
WTO  
+ Better flow of information  
 Stephenson, 2016 
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The WTO ignores the growing 
importance of private 
regulation and standards for 
trade. 
Realising the potential of 
private transnational 
regulation 
+ Tab on the potential of 
private initiatives to facilitate 
trade  
 Mavroidis, 2016 
 Arvíus and Jachia, 2015 
 Thorstensen et al., 2015 
 Wijkström, 2015 
The collapse of the Doha 
Round translates into 
stagnating primary law.  
Finding the right balance for 
the DSB to interpret existing 
WTO law in light of new policy 
challenges  
+ Keep DSB relevant  
+ Maintain coherent trade law 
- Risk of overstepping 
mandate  
- Risk of undermining 
legitimacy of DSB 
 Wolf, 2016 
  
The rise of PTAs and PAs risks 
side-lining the WTO DSB in the 
long-run promoting a 
fragmentation of the regime 
and trade law.  
Anchor the WTO DSB in a 
complex trade regime  
+ Keep DSB relevant  
+ Maintain coherent trade law 
 
 Stoler, 2016 
 Vickers, 2014 
 
 
Overall challenge  Concrete problem Reform proposal  Opportunities & threats  Relevant E15 paper 
Ensuring the effectiveness 
and efficiency of WTO work 
The rising number of PTAs 
risks becoming stumbling 
rather than building blocks for 
the multilateral trade regime.   
Create a PTA exchange + Concentrating knowledge on 
PTAs in one institution 
+ Provide data on PTA effects  
+ Ensure multilateral 
friendliness of PTAs 
 Suominen, 2013 
 Estevadeordal et al., 2013 
 Stoler, 2016 
The rising number of PTAs 
risks becoming stumbling 
rather than building blocks for 
the multilateral trade regime.   
Introduce multilateral impact 
assessment  
+ Ensure creation of welfare-
enhancing PTAs & PAs 
 Lawrence, 2013 
The rising number of PTAs 
risks becoming stumbling 
rather than building blocks for 
the multilateral trade regime.   
Create a committee and 
guidelines to coordinate PA 
initiatives and ensure a 
multilateral-friendly PA design 
+ Increase legitimacy of PAs 
+ Greater transparency to 
maximise trade through PAs  
+ Ensure multilateral-
friendliness of PAs including 
 Elsig, 2016 
 Vickers, 2014 
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on question of ‘critical mass’ 
or preferential PAs 
The rise of PTAs and PAs 
might de facto side-line 
developing and least 
developed countries and 
thereby create a two-tier trade 
regime.   
Assistance to developing and 
least developed countries 
wishing to join PAs or PTAs 
+ Ensure that PAs deliver also 
for developing countries 
+ Avoid fragmentation of trade 
regime 
 Estevadeordal et al., 2013 
 Suominen, 2014 
 Vickers, 2014 
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